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Abstract
Today more than half of the world population has fertil-
ity below the replacement level, i.e., less than two
surviving children per woman; and there are now several
countries where fertility has dropped to levels that are of
serious concern to policy-makers. All major population
projections currently assume that fertility in the countries
with the lowest levels will recover or at least not decline
any further. Should birth rates, however, defy these projec-
tions and continue to decline, then these populations would
shrink and age much more rapidly than currently assumed.
The “low fertility trap hypothesis” discussed in this contri-
bution gives plausible reasons why indeed fewer and fewer
people may want to have children in the future.
Introduction
Reproduction secures the survival of our species and also
assures the continuation of culture through the transmission
of skills and norms. As long as the level of fertility was
broadly in line with the level of mortality and hence assured
relatively stable population size or moderate increases, there
seemed to be little concern about the overall level of human
fertility. The focus was more on the implications of differ-
ential fertility, i.e., some countries or some social groups
growing more rapidly than others and hence changing the
balance of power. When over the second half of the 20th
century the “population explosion” resulted in a more than
doubling of world population from 2.5 billion in 1950 to
6.1 billion in 2000, with significant further growth already
preprogrammed in the young population age structure, the
high level of fertility in developing countries became a
major policy concern. It still is so today for Africa and
Western Asia, while the rest of the world has seen remark-
ably rapid fertility declines. Today more than half of the
world population has fertility below the replacement level,
i.e., less than two surviving children per woman (Wilson,
2004). Based on these recent developments we can expect
that with high probability the 21st century will see the end
of world population growth and possibly the beginning of
a long term decline (Lutz et al., 2001). The degree to
which this will happen will largely depend on the long term
fertility levels in post-demographic transition societies.
A famous quote attributed to both Winston Churchill and
Konrad Adenauer is: “People will always want to have
children.” This seemed self-evident until very recently and
the low fertility rates in some countries were attributed to
problems in achieving one’s ideal family size rather than
lack of want. But new data show that ideal family size
seems to be on the decline in many countries (Goldstein et
al., 2003). Is there a chance that Churchill and Adenauer
were wrong after all? The “low fertility trap hypothesis”
gives plausible reasons why indeed fewer and fewer people
may want to have children in the future. But not only the
wants may change; there may be new obstacles to actually
having the children that people still want to have. While
much has been said about the problems for women to
combine work and family, there are new disturbing find-
ings on declining sperm counts which, e.g., in Denmark
make it likely that about 20 percent of the young men today
will not be able to father a child naturally. These two recent
developments alone suggest that one should have a closer
look at the forces that may influence tomorrow’s birth rate.
All major population projections currently assume that
fertility in the countries with the lowest levels will
recover or at least not decline any further. Should birth
rates, however, defy these projections and continue to
decline, then the populations concerned would shrink
and age much more rapidly than currently assumed. In
that case we would have to revise the demographic basis
for all assessments of the possible consequences of popu-
lation ageing and decline - ranging from the ruminations
of the EU-EcoFin (economics and finance ministers)
group to debates about future family care patterns of the
elderly and much more.
Since there is no comprehensive theory to guide our think-
ing about the future level of the birth rate in low fertility
countries, this highly relevant issue, which is necessary as
a basis for planning, can only be understood through a
broad and truly interdisciplinary research program that
combines bio-medical factors (both on the female and male
side) with evolutionary anthropology as well as sociologi-
cal, economic and psychological approaches. Demography
is well positioned to serve as the interface between the
different disciplines by converting different discipline-
specific approaches and contributions into one common
currency: the future number of births. In the following I
will discuss a few considerations that could possibly lead
to such a new and ambitious research endeavor.
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The Lack of a Theory with Predictive Power
in Post-Demographic Transition Populations
Explanations and projections of fertility trends in different
parts of the world have been generally guided by the para-
digm of demographic transition which assumes that after
an initial decline in death rates, birth rates – after a certain
lag – start to fall. In this general form, the demographic
transition model has received overwhelming empirical
support in capturing the remarkable fertility changes that
happened during the 20th century.
The demographic transition began in the late 18th and 19th
centuries in today’s more-developed countries (MDCs) and
spread to today’s less-developed countries (LDCs) in the
latter half of the 20th century (Notestein, 1945; Davis,
1954, 1991; Coale, 1973). The conventional “theory” of
demographic transition predicts that as living standards rise
and health conditions improve, mortality rates first decline
and then, somewhat later, so do fertility rates. Demographic
transition “theory” has evolved as a generalization of the
typical sequence of events in what are now MDCs, where
mortality rates declined comparatively gradually from the
late 1700s and then more rapidly in the late 1800s and
where, after a gap of up to 100 years, fertility rates also
declined. Different societies experienced transition in differ-
ent ways, and today various regions of the world are
following distinctive paths (Tabah, 1989). Nonetheless, the
broad result was, and is, a gradual transition from a small,
slow-growing population with high mortality and high fertil-
ity to a large, slow-growing or even slowly shrinking
population with low mortality and low fertility rates. During
the transition itself, population growth accelerates because
the decline in death rates precedes the decline in birth rates.
Unfortunately, the demographic transition paradigm –
although useful for explaining global demographic trends
during the 20th century and having strong predictive power
in terms of projecting future trends in countries that still
have high fertility – essentially has nothing to say about the
future of fertility in Europe (Lutz, 1994; 2006). The recently
popular notion of a “second demographic transition” is a
plausible way of describing a bundle of behavioral and
normative changes that took place recently in Europe, but
it has little or no predictive power. In fact, the social
sciences as a whole have yet to come up with a useful
theory to predict the future fertility level of post-demo-
graphic transition societies. Forecasters can only try to
define a likely range of uncertainty. As the fertility transi-
tion is irreversible, we are quite sure that the fertility rate
will not go back to pre-transitional high levels, say, to
above a value of 3.0. There is no equally convincing argu-
ment about a lower bound, although many demographers
tend to think that fertility is unlikely to fall below 1.0 for
long periods. But, as we will see from the discussion below,
there are reasons to think that fertility will fall even lower,
and there is a real possibility that future fertility will show
the strong fluctuations in terms of booms and busts we
have seen over the past decades. Hence, thinking in terms
of a long-term stable level – as underlies the population
projections of the United Nations and of many statistical
agencies – may be the wrong way of thinking about the
future.
Six Dimensions Shaping the Future of
Fertility
How can we meaningfully talk about the future of fertility
when there is no consistent theory? Much research has been
carried out over the past decades that tried to identify and
study specific determinants of fertility and the individual
level covariates of fertility and specific settings. But little
has been achieved so far in terms of drawing a compre-
hensive picture of what will drive the overall birth rates in
the future.
It is quite surprising, on the other hand, to see how little
the agencies producing population projections make use of
the vast – although fragmented – body of existing scien-
tific literature on fertility determinants. While this can be
partly blamed on the scientists who fail to present a compre-
hensive picture of their findings to the forecasters,
forecasters themselves often seem to prefer rather mecha-
nistic extrapolation methods or smooth approaches to a set
target level rather than going through a painful process of
consultations with experts who are reluctant to be nailed
down to any specific statements on the future.
As a step toward improving this clearly unsatisfactory situ-
ation, a European Union research project, which aims at
providing a better basis for population projections in Europe
by combining modeling at the micro- and macro-level
(acronym MicMac), has recently developed a comprehen-
sive assessment scheme that structures different arguments
that would point toward higher or lower fertility in the
future around six main forces that shape the level of future
cohort fertility.1 The scheme relies on expert-based assess-
ment of factors influencing the birth rate and has recently
been applied for defining the assumptions for the new UK
National Population Projections (ONS,  2007). The follow-
ing independent forces, which will jointly determine the
future birth rate, are being considered:
Trend in ideal family size and the strength of individ-
ual desires for children. Although answers to ideal or
desired family size questions in surveys cannot be seen as
direct predictors of fertility at the individual level, their
changes over time can give us some indication in what
direction the desire for children is moving. Empirical data
show that personal ideal family size tends to be higher than
actual family size in most European countries. Because of
various obstacles as well as competing desires, many couples
have less children than they say they consider ideal. With
all its problems, this indicator still comes closest to the most
fundamental question concerning the future of reproduction,
namely, to what degree people still want children in the
future, and how strongly they value children in compari-
son to other things that life has to offer. Unless it is
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somehow part of human nature that people want to have at
least two children on average, changing social norms can
lead to sub-replacement ideal family sizes and possibly in
the future to much lower levels than we have seen so far.
This is the focus of the low fertility trap hypothesis which
will be discussed in detail below.
Trend in the pattern of education and work, including
the proportion of time dedicated to the professional side
of life. It is widely acknowledged that the expansion of
education for both men and women in most European coun-
tries has been associated with a significant postponement
of childbearing. Entry into the labour market after educa-
tion has become more difficult, and working life itself has
become more competitive as a result of globalization. In
many European countries, young employees who in the
past used to get more or less permanent positions now have
to jump from one short term contract to the next. Under
such conditions it becomes more difficult to decide to estab-
lish a family and not dedicate all of their time and energy
to a professional career. Globalization and the flexibility
goals pursued under the Lisbon agenda can be at odds with
the desirability of more secure and sheltered conditions
during the first years of family formation. How this balance
of time and energy allocation between work and private life
will develop in the future can be expected to have imme-
diate consequences on the rate of childbearing.
Changing macro-level conditions (government policies,
childcare facilities, housing conditions etc.) that influence
the cost of children in a broader sense.  Economic consid-
erations do play a role when deciding about the number of
children to have, even though other factors tend to dominate
the decision. Both the economic incentive structures and the
costs of children differ greatly among European countries. A
look at the French experience shows that a massive redistri-
bution (in the tax system as well as through direct child
benefits) from those with no or few children to those with
three or more, carried out consistently over many decades,
did indeed prevent fertility from showing the same declines
that were experienced by most neighboring countries. While
the effectiveness of specific policy measures aimed at increas-
ing fertility is difficult to assess due to the complexity of the
entire incentive structure (ranging from the social security
system to the housing market and cultural factors), there is
little doubt that significant changes in this structure influence
fertility. And in the case of a high desired family size, this is
probably easier to achieve than in cases where desired family
size has already declined. 
Changing nature and stability of partnership. It still
takes two people, a woman and a man, to produce a
child. Having a child is a very long term commitment
(at least 18 years?). The presence of children makes a
big difference to the lifestyle of their parents, and
usually, the responsibility is considered a lower burden
when it is shared between both parents. But couple rela-
tionships, whether marriages or non-marital unions,
show a tendency to be less stable over time. In almost
all Western societies, divorce and separation rates have
been on the rise. Because births are most intimately
linked to partnerships, trends in the nature and stability
of partnerships must also affect the birth rates, although
there can be effects in opposing directions: Women may
decide not to have children, if they cannot count on
their partners to stay with them and take part in the
childrearing; on the other hand, a new partnership after
separation may be an incentive to have an additional
child with the new partner. The net effect of these
opposing forces is culture specific and hard to predict.
Changes in the population composition and differential
trends in population subgroups. Some national populations
in Europe have become more heterogeneous over the past
decades. This is mostly due to immigration. Specific ethnic
or religious subgroups of the population have fertility rates
that are twice that of the rest of the population. And even
in the second generation, the fertility rates of those
subgroups remain significantly higher in many of the coun-
tries concerned. Over time the share of these high fertility
subgroups in the total population has a tendency to increase
as a direct consequence of their higher fertility and in many
countries also through continued immigration of new
members of these subgroups. The future fertility rates at
the national level can be significantly influenced by such
changes in population composition. The extent of this
upward force on the birth rate will depend on the persist-
ence of fertility differentials and on future migration.
Changing bio-medical conditions. Bio-medical consider-
ations have been largely absent from the social science
discourse about the determinants of fertility, because it has
typically been assumed that the decision by a couple to
have a child suffices to bring one into being. This assump-
tion has already been criticized with respect to the
prevalence of unplanned pregnancies. Retrospective surveys
show that generally some 10–30 percent of all births are
classified as unplanned (by the interviewed women them-
selves) with great variations across countries and by the
order of births. Future progress in contraceptive technol-
ogy could have a substantial impact on further lowering the
birth rate, if it eliminated or greatly reduced this still surpris-
ingly high proportion of unplanned pregnancies, e.g., by
requiring an active step – such as seeing a doctor – in case
one wants to get pregnant. Another highly relevant bio-
medical factor on the female side is the combination of
continued postponement of childbearing to higher and higher
ages and the fact that fecundability (the monthly probabil-
ity of conception) starts to decline around age 30 and is
already significantly reduced after age 35. This age pattern
of fecundability has been remarkably stable over time due
to a finite number of egg cells. As a consequence, one not
only observes a dramatic rise in the number of fertility
treatments, but also an increase in involuntary childlessness.
Future improvements in assisted reproductive technologies
or behavioral changes with respect to the age at which
women decide to have their children can have important
impacts on future birth rates.
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On the male side there may be even more significant repro-
ductive health problems ahead. Recent studies on sperm
quantities and quality seem to indicate a significant deteri-
oration which is largely attributed to exposure to endocrine
disrupters in utero. For Denmark where the problem has
been studied most extensively and representative samples
are taken from all army recruits, Skakkebaek et al. (2001)
estimate that about 20 percent of young men today will not
be able to father a child naturally. There are only a few
other comprehensive studies on this problem, but similar
results have been found in studies for Edinburgh, Hamburg
and Leipzig. The most worrying aspect of these studies is
the trend over time. While studies in the US during the
1940s (using the same method to count sperms) found a
sperm concentration of more than 100 Mio/ml for the major-
ity of the men, Figure 1 shows that now, more than 40
percent of Danish men have a concentration below the 40
Mio/ml threshold, which is considered problematic, and 20
percent are below 20 Mio/ml, which implies severe sub-
fecundity. The specific reasons for this trend are not yet
well understood, although the causes in utero lie two decades
before the measured consequence. But if this trend contin-
ues in the future, higher proportions of men may fall into
this category. Unless the couples affected can be helped
through in vitro fertilization, it would inevitably lead to
lower birth rates.
The future of the birth rate will be a function of the inter-
action of these six dimensions of change. The future trend
in each of these dimensions is uncertain and their interac-
tion is even more so. Yet we are not completely ignorant
of the likely forces that shape the future of these dimen-
sions. Much research has been conducted over the past
decades on the individual factors. What has been lacking
most of all is a truly interdisciplinary integration of these
different aspects that will jointly result in a certain fertil-
ity level in the future. We need to integrate into one model
all the social and economic forces that determine the ideal
family size and the desired timing of birth for both men
and women, their partnership dynamics together with their
educational and professional careers, and finally, the bio-
medical aspects both on the male and female side. Since
such analysis cannot be carried out at the aggregate level
of averages because there is major individual heterogene-
ity along all these dimensions, a promising avenue of
research is to apply methods of agent-based modeling which
have the potential to combine these bio-medical and behav-
ioral aspects under one common framework.
As a first, modest step in this direction of integrating several
of the relevant dimensions in a dynamic and interactive
way, I will discuss one specific, testable hypothesis in the
second part of this contribution.
The Hypothesis of a “Low Fertility Trap”
for Countries that already have the Lowest
Fertility
In order to stimulate the scientific and theory oriented
discussion about the future of human reproduction, I will
discuss here a hypothesis which, if true, implies significant
further declines in the birth rates for those countries that
already have the lowest levels of fertility with immense
consequences for population ageing and shrinking. It
assumes self-reinforcing mechanisms leading to a bifurcation
in trends among industrialized countries. While countries
which are at or are only slightly below replacement level
fertility can expect rather stable levels, those that have been
well below replacement for longer periods would enter a
downward spiral of birth rates due to negative population
momentum, declines in ideal family size among younger
cohorts as a consequence of being socialized in a low fertility
setting, and worsening relative income of young couples as
compared to their parents. While some recent data support
this hypothesis, more rigorous testing is needed.
Starting Point
Fertility trends in industrialized countries have shown an
interesting bifurcation over the past decade. Some countries
(including the US, UK, France and Nordic countries) have
relatively stable levels of total fertility rates (TFRs) between
1.7 and 2.0, while many (in other parts of Europe and in
East Asia) have seen TFRs falling to below 1.5 with no
recovery since. Currently 25 of these very low fertility
countries have TFRs of 1.3 (two-thirds of replacement level
fertility) or below. Belarus, Ukraine, Slovenia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Singapore have TFRs of 1.2; South Korea
and Taiwan 1.1; Hong Kong 1.0; and Macao 0.9
(Population Reference Bureau 2006). In Singapore and
South Korea, these very low levels of fertility exist despite
explicitly pro-natalist government policies.
Population projections typically assume that these low levels
are only a short-term deviation and fertility will soon
recover. Of the three multi-lateral agencies publishing inde-
pendent projections, the United Nations (2005) assumes
that the TFRs of all countries converge to 1.85. Eurostat
(2007) assumes that future TFRs will be stable around
recent cohort fertility levels (implying a mild TFR increase
in most countries). The International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA) assumes that long-term fertility
levels will lie between 1.5 and 2.0 with the specific level
being a function of population density (Lutz et al., 2001).
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Figure 1:  Sperm concentration of young men: United States
1945 vs. Denmark 1996-2005. Source: Skakkebæk (2007).
No agency assumes continued fertility decline in the main
scenario.
In the absence of a good theory about the future trend of
fertility in low fertility countries, all of these assumptions
are more or less arbitrary. It is surprising, however, that
so far no group assumed a simple continuation of the declin-
ing trend which in other contexts is considered the most
obvious and straightforward assumption. The same groups
assume that life expectancy will (with the exception of
countries affected by AIDS) continue along the increasing
trend generally observed over past decades. One would
expect that there must be convincing reasons (such as the
effects of AIDS) for assuming a discontinuity in a perva-
sive trend. But what are the reasons for countries that have
experienced strong fertility declines over the past decades?
A recent summary of substantive arguments concerning
future fertility trends in Europe (Lutz, 2006) identified only
two convincing reasons for supposing that there might be
a trend reversal in period fertility rates: (a) effective fertil-
ity enhancing policies, and (b) an end of the tempo effect,
i.e., the depression of period fertility rates due to the post-
ponement of births. As far as (a) is concerned, the extensive
literature on fertility enhancing policies suggests that there
is no magic bullet and that pro-natalist policies (France) or
social policies indirectly affecting fertility (Nordic countries)
had to be in place for decades to be effective. In other coun-
tries, the introduction of specific fertility enhancing
incentives had little to no effect (Gauthier, 2002; Sobotka
et al., 2005). And as for (b), there is one example where
the tempo effect has already come to an end: in Spain the
recent leveling off of the increase in the mean age of child-
bearing has only resulted in a very mild increase in TFR
to still below 1.4 (VID/IIASA, 2006). This casts some
doubts on the potential of these two mechanisms to signif-
icantly increase the birth rates in the near future. But there
may be powerful forces toward still lower fertility in coun-
tries that already have very low fertility.
Three Forces Leading to Fewer Births
The low fertility trap (LFT) hypothesis as discussed here
consists of three independent elements that work in the
same direction and reinforce each other (Lutz et al., 2006).
The absolute number of births in a population is a function
of the age pattern of period fertility and the age structure
of the population (see Figure 2). Period fertility results
from a combination of cohort fertility and shifts in the
timing of fertility, which can have different determinants.
Finally, we assume that the level of cohort fertility is influ-
enced among other factors (including biological ones) by
norms about the personal ideal family size.
LFT-1 operates at the level of population dynamics and
reflects the negative momentum of population growth. It
refers to the influence of the age structure on the number
of births. While in developing countries momentum is a
major force toward growth (Bongaarts, 1994), it can turn
into a force toward shrinking following extended periods
of very low fertility. Fewer and fewer women enter the
reproductive age, and, hence the number of births will
decline, even if fertility instantly jumps to replacement
level. It has been shown that the EU as a whole recently
entered negative momentum and in some countries it is far
advanced (Lutz et al., 2003). This process in itself causes
a downward spiral in the number of births.
LFT-2 operates at the level of social norms and refers to
changes in personal ideal family size, which is assumed to be
one of the factors determining cohort fertility. Personal ideal
family size tends to be markedly higher than actual fertility,
but it seems to be on the decline in several European coun-
tries (Goldstein et al., 2003). LFT-2 is based on the hypothesis
that such a decline in ideals was triggered by declines in actual
fertility some time ago. The German-speaking countries,
which in the 1970s were the first to see fertility fall to very
low levels (TFRs around 1.5 or below), now are the first to
show below replacement family size ideals among the younger
cohorts. LFT-2 assumes that through the process of social-
ization and social learning, the norms and in particular the
family size ideals of the young generation are influenced by
what they experience around them. If their environment
includes few or no children, children will figure less promi-
nently in their own image of a desirable life.
LFT-3 is derived from the first part of Easterlin’s (1980) rela-
tive income hypothesis, which views fertility as a function of
the match between personal aspirations for consumption
(largely determined by the income level in the family of
origin) and expected income of the young (formed by current
labor market experiences). If aspirations are higher than
expected income, this will result in lower fertility, and vice
versa. There are several forces that could bring down expected
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Figure 2:  The demographic (LFT-1), sociological (LFT-2)
and economic (LFT-3) mechanisms that constitute the low
fertility trap hypothesis. Source: Lutz et al. (2006, p.175).
income in ageing societies. The necessary downward adjust-
ments in social security typically affect younger cohorts more
than older ones; and, in contrast to Easterlin’s expectation
that smaller cohorts have higher incomes, rapid population
ageing may also result in lower economic growth and less job
creation in the future (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor,
2004). Whatever the economic consequences of rapid ageing
may be, many surveys have shown that younger people today
have a more pessimistic outlook to the future (Blossfeld et
al., 2005). On the other hand, youngsters today tend to have
higher aspirations for material consumption as their parents
have greatly benefited from the economic boom of the past
decades (Stutzer, 2004). There is also a demographic factor:
Due to declining fertility, children had to share parental wealth
with fewer siblings. A first analysis of OECD data suggests
that indeed the income of younger men today is in real terms
lower than that of their fathers a decade ago, and that the rela-
tive income gap is widening over time for several countries,
with Italy showing particularly strong declines (Lutz et al.,
2006).
Relevance and Test
It is justified to talk about a trap if a situation is consid-
ered undesirable, was entered unintentionally, and is
difficult, if not impossible, to escape. All three conditions
will be met in very low fertility countries, if the hypothe-
sis is true. The validity of this hypothesis will have most
significant implications for government policies. If it is
false, there is no reason for specific birth enhancing poli-
cies; but if it is true, governments may want to take serious
action before it is too late to escape the trap.
LFT-1 need not be tested because it is analytically well estab-
lished (Keyfitz, 1971). LFT-2 can be tested by observing the
evolution of ideal family sizes in the Mediterranean countries
that had their precipitous TFR declines about a decade later
than the German-speaking countries. The prediction is that
younger cohorts in those countries will now start to have lower
ideals, while in the higher fertility countries, family size ideals
would remain stable at high levels. This is precisely what the
newest data from the Eurobarometer 2006 show as depicted in
Figure 3 for six selected countries (Testa, 2006). While
between 2001 and 2006 the ideals are constant at a high level
for Sweden, France and UK, they have a declining trend in
Spain and Italy and are further declining at a very low level in
Austria. But this first evidence needs to be further substanti-
ated. No comprehensive testing could be done for LFT-3 yet.
Because of its great and urgent importance for policy, the
hypothesis should not just be tested by waiting and seeing
how the trends will evolve, but rather by collecting more
information aimed explicitly at testing this hypothesis for
Europe and East Asia. More comparable data are needed on
the trends and differentials of ideal family size and its inter-
action with actual fertility as well as on the changes in relative
income. This could be mostly achieved by utilizing existing
data collection instruments and include specific additional
items. But this will only happen if the relevant institutions
become aware of this hypothesis and its significance.
Conclusions
Policy makers in Europe have not yet decided whether they
should make the level of the birth rate an explicit object of
government policies. Apart from France which made this
decision many decades ago, in most of the very low fertility
countries there is considerable opposition to direct govern-
ment interference with private decisions in the matter of
family size, though this is combined with dissatisfaction about
the low level of fertility. The recent Communication by the
European Commission on “The demographic future of
Europe–from challenge to opportunity” is indicative of this
uneasy and ambivalent attitude with respect to pronatalistic
policies. The section that addresses possible birth enhancing
policies has the supposedly euphemistic title “Promoting
demographic renewal in Europe.”2 The document suggests
that governments focus on policies that enable couples to have
the number of children they want to have. It uses the data
already discussed on ideal family size to argue that there is a
gap between desired and actual family size, and that it could
be closed by social policies that are already desirable for other
social or gender policy reasons (such as better child care facil-
ities). Whether this is indeed likely to result in an increase in
the birth rate and is an efficient use of resources has recently
been questioned by several scholars including the economist
Gary Becker (2007).
The choice between abstaining from the adoption of birth-
enhancing policies and the introduction of targeted and
effective fertility programs depends largely on the perceived
negative consequences of low fertility. And surely the sever-
ity of these consequences will depend on the question of
how low fertility will be in the future. Hence, in the end
the question boils down to anticipating the future course of
the birth rate–with and without explicit policies. Given our
ignorance in this field and the overriding importance of the
issue, it certainly deserves more systematic research atten-
tion.
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Figure 3:  Personal ideal family size in 2001 and 2006 for
six selected countries, women aged 25–39. Source of data:
Testa (2006).
21
AGEING HORIZONS Issue No 7 OXFORD INSTITUTE OF AGEING
References
Becker, G. (2007) Mit Ende 50 in Rente – das sind perverse
Anreize. Interview conducted at the 37th St. Gallen Symposium
in Switzerland, May 31 – June 2, 2007. Spiegel Online.
Available from:
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,487901,00.html.
Accessed July 5, 2007. In German.
Blossfeld, H.-P., Klijzing, E.,  Mills, M., and Kurz, K. (eds.)
(2005) Globalization, Uncertainty and Youth in Society.
London/New York: Routledge.
Bongaarts, J. (1994) Population policy options in the developing
world. Science, 263, pp.771–776.
Coale, A.J. (1973) The demographic transition. Proceedings of the
International Population Conference, Vol. 1. Liège, Belgium:
International Union for the Scientific Study of Population.
Davis, K. (1954) The world demographic transition. Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 237,
pp.1–11.
Davis, K. (1991) Population and resources: Fact and interpretation.
In: Davis, K. and Bernstam, M.S. (eds.) Resources, Environment
and Population: Present Knowledge. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, pp.1–21.
Easterlin, R.A. (1980) Birth and Fortune: The Impact of Numbers
on Personal Welfare. New York: Basic Books.
Eurostat (2007) Eurostat Population Data Navigation Tree.
Available from: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu. Accessed July
5, 2007.
Gauthier, A.H. (2002) Family policies in industrialized countries:
Is there convergence? Population, 57(2), pp.447–474.
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2004) National Team Reports.
Babson Park, MA: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. Available
from: http://www.gemconsortium.org. Accessed July 5, 2007.
Goldstein, J., Lutz, W., and Testa, M.R. (2003) The emergence of
sub-replacement family size ideals in Europe. Population
Research and Policy Review 22(5–6), pp.479–496.
Keyfitz, N. (1971) On the momentum of population growth.
Demography 8(1), pp.71–80.
Lutz, W. (1994) Future reproductive behavior in industrialized
countries. In: Lutz, W. (ed.) The Future Population of the
World. What Can We Assume Today? London: Earthscan,
pp.267–294.
Lutz, W. (2006) Alternative paths for future European fertility:
Will the birth rate recover or continue to decline? In: Lutz, W.,
Richter, R., and Wilson, C.  (eds.) The New Generations of
Europeans. Demography and Families in the Enlarged European
Union. London: Earthscan, pp.83–100.
Lutz, W., O’Neill, B.C., and Scherbov, S. (2003) Europe’s
population at a turning point. Science, 299, pp.1991–1992.
Lutz, W., Sanderson, W., and Scherbov, S. (2001) The end of
world population growth. Nature, 412, pp.543–545.
Lutz, W., Skirbekk, V., and Testa, M.R. (2006) The low fertility
trap hypothesis: Forces that may lead to further postponement
and fewer births in Europe. In: Philipov, D., Liefbroer, A.C.,
and Billari, F.C. (guest eds.) Vienna Yearbook of Population
Research 2006, Special issue on “Postponement of Childbearing
in Europe”. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften, pp.167–192.
Notestein, F.W. (1945) Population–The long view. In: Schultz,
T.W. (ed.) Food for the World. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, pp.36–57.
ONS (2007) 2006-based National Population Projections. London:
Office for National Statistics. Available from:
http://www.statistics.gov.uk.
Population Reference Bureau (2006) World Population Data Sheet.
Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau. Available from:
http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2006/2006WorldPop
ulationDataSheet.aspx. Accessed July 7, 2007.
Skakkebæk, N.E. (2007) Opening remarks at the 4th Copenhagen
Workshop on Endocrine Disrupters, held at the Copenhagen
University Hospital, Denmark, May 28–31, 2007. Unpublished
powerpoint presentation.
Skakkebæk, N.E., Rajpert-De Meyts, E., and Main, K.M. (2001)
Testicular dysgenesis syndrome: An increasingly common
developmental disorder with environmental aspects. Human
Reproduction, 5, pp.972–978.
Sobotka, T., M. Winkler-Dworak, M.R. Testa, W. Lutz, D.
Philipov, H. Engelhardt, and Gisser, R. (2005) Monthly estimates
of the quantum of fertility: Towards a fertility monitoring system
in Austria. In: Lutz, W. and Feichtinger, G. (eds.) Vienna
Yearbook of Population Research 2005. Vienna: Verlag der Öster-
reichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, pp.109–141.
Stutzer, A. (2004) The role of income aspirations in individual
happiness. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
54(1), pp.89–109.
Tabah, L. (1989) From one demographic transition to another.
Population Bulletin of the United Nations, 28, pp.1–24.
Testa, M.R. (2006) Childbearing Preferences and Family Issues in
Europe. Paper presented at the First Forum on Europe’s
Demographic Future, held at the European Commission,
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Brussels,
October 30–31, 2006. Available from:
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/events/2006/demog/euroba
rometer_2006_fertility_en.pdf.
United Nations (2005) World Population Prospects. The 2004
Revision. New York: United Nations, Department of Economic
and Social Affairs, Population Division.
VID/IIASA (2006) European Demographic Data Sheet 2006.
Vienna: Vienna Institute of Demography; Laxenburg, Austria:
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Available
from: http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/popeurope/download/. Accessed
July 5, 2007.
Wilson, C. (2004) Fertility below replacement level. Science,
5668(April 9, 2004), pp.207–209.
Notes
1 More information about the MicMac Project is available from:
http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/en/micmac/.
2 Unfortunately, in population analysis the term “demographic
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